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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Workmen's Compensation-Accidents Arising Out of and in the
Course of Employment of Traveling Employees
The question of the extent of coverage afforded traveling employees
under workmen's compensation laws was raised in the recent case of
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Thornton.1 The decedent, a
traveling salesman, had registered at an Athens hotel and had made
several business visits in the city before returning thereto. As was his
custom when in Athens, he ate at a cafe several doors from the hotel
on the opposite side of the street. Due to a rainstorm the street surface
was slippery; and deceased, in returning to the hotel, fell and sustained
injuries from which he died. The Court of Appeals reversed the su-
perior court's affirmation of an award by the industrial board to the
deceased's widow. The reversal was based on the conclusion that the
deceased had finished his day's work at the time of the accident and
was returning from a mission of his own, so that he was not engaged
in fulfilling any of the duties of his employment or doing anything
incidental thereto, and the accident causing death could not be said to
have arisen "out of and in the course of the employment."
As difficult of application and definition as are the terms "out of"
and "in the course of" when measuring the propinquity of the ordinary
worker to the pursuit of the objects of his employment, even more
ethereal become unqualified instances of application when the claim-
ant's occupation is that of traveling employee. The discretionary
powers granted such employees and the extended area in which they
conduct their activities give to them certain characteristics smacking of
the nature of independent contract. However, having concluded that
these employees are encompassed by the act, the courts have assumed
the burden of making the ultimate finding of whether, as a matter of
law, the specific employee is injured in an accident "arising out of and
in the course of the employment." These findings, even when weighed
by the variant wording of the different statutes, have not always been
consistent.
Granting that the traveling salesman, while in his own home and
pursuing none but his own ends, is outside the act, and assuming that
his intention in undertaking a journey is to do an act in furtherance of
his employer's business, the question arises as to the point in the
journey at which the act will undertake to give protection. In Green
v. Hiestand Bros.,2 compensation was allowed by the Pennsylvania
court where the employee was found dead in his private garage of
monoxide poisoning, the circumstances showing that he had been re-
pairing his car preparatory to calling on customers. The decedent
'-Ga. App. -, 31 S. E. (2d) 115 (1944).
' 103 Pa. Super. 515, 157 AtI. 44 (1931)L
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owned the car but was compensated by his employer for its use on
company business. A later Pennsylvania decision followed the Green
case, supra, under a similar fact situation where the employee was
provided with the car by his employer.3
The New York Court of Appeals announced the New York doc-
trine in Harby v. Marwell Bros.4 The decedent had been killed while
going with his sample case from his home to take a train to visit his
customers. In affirming an award the court held that a traveling man
begins his work when he leaves his home or the place where he lives
or passes the night to visit directly a customer. A Nebraska decision5
followed the same line of reasoning in allowing compensation where
the decedent was killed while crossing the street from his home office
toward a taxi stand for the purpose of hiring a taxi to take him to the
railroad station where he was to catch a train for a business trip.
A number of states, however, Massachusetts being particularly no-
table among them, have refused compensation for injuries incurred
from "street risks" while the traveling employee is upon a public thor-
oughfare. The principle, as announced in Donahue's Case,0 is to the
effect that an injury to an employee, suffered while on a public thor-
oughfare, does not arise out of the employment, even though the em-
ployee is called upon to use the street in the performance of his work;
that the risks of such injuries are common to everyone traveling the
highway, whether employed or unemployed, and are not peculiar to
the employment. This rule was followed by the Massachusetts court
in a number of cases,7 until the state legislature amended the workmen's
compensation provisions of the state in 1927 to include compensation
for injuries sustained through ordinary street risks.8 It is interesting to
note that before this legislative action the same court followed the
street risk doctrine and denied compensation in Braley's Case,9 after
having failed to apply it just one year earlier in Moran's Case,10 where
the injury resulted from the employee's attempting to board a street
car. The court announced that the cases were distinguishable, but
failed clearly to distinguish them. Had we to 'depend on the authority
'Beck v. Ashton, 124 Pa. Super. 307, 188 At. 368 (1936).
' 203 App. Div. 525, 196 N. Y. Supp. 729 (1922) ; cf. Kowalek v. New York
Consol. R. Co., 229 N. Y. 489, 128 N. E. 888 (1920).
'Kirkpatrick v. Chocolate Sales Corp., 127 Neb. 604, 256 N. W. 89 (1934).
'226 Mass. 595, 116 N. E. 226, L. R. A. 1918A, 215, (1917) (Salesman was
injured in fall on icy street.).
'Blakely's Case, 252 Mass. 212, 147 N. E. 576 (1925) (fell on icy street);
Whitley's Case, 252 Mass. 212, 147 N. E. 576 (1925) (slipped on icy surface);
Braley's Case, 237 Mass. 105, 129 N. E. 420 (1921) (turned and broke ankle
while leaving street car); Hewitt's Case, 221 Mass. 1,113 N. E. 572, L. R. A.
1917B, 249 (1917) (traveling in car which overturned).
'MASS. ANN. LAWS (Michie, 1942) c. 152 §26.
'237 Mass. 105, 129 N. E. 420 (1921), cited supra note 7.
"0234 Mass. 566, 125 N. E. 591 (1920); accord, Cook's Case, 243 Mass. 572,
137 N. E. 733 (1923).
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of these cases alone, we would be faced by the paradoxical situation of
traveling employees being protected by the Workmen's Compensation
Act while boarding street railway cars, but assuming the risks attendant
to debarking therefrom, regardless of the fact that both actions were
undertaken pursuant to the employment. Fortunately, the legislative
amendment has precluded any such anomaly.
The Indiana," Illinois,12 and Wisconsin1 3 courts have allowed com-
pensation for injuries to traveling employees through street accidents,
but the neighboring jurisdiction of Michigan, in Hopkins v. Michigan
Sugar Co.,14 chose to apply the earlier Massachusetts view in regard
to street risks.' 5
Unlike the "street risk" cases just dicussed, where the employee
is unquestionably on the streets in the performance of his duties, there
is a class of cases which, like the principal case, raises the question
whether the employee, when injured, was fulfilling the duties of his
employment or doing anything incidental thereto, so that the injury
can be said to have arisen "out of and in the course of the employ-
ment."'1 6 In determining the status of the employee at the time of the
injury, many extrinsic factors must be taken into consideration, such
as the location of the accident,' the time of its occurrence, the condi-
tion of the employee at the time of the accident, whether he was acting
in a manner which the employer might reasonably contemplate, and
"Capital Paper Co. v. Conner, 81 Ind. App. 545, 547, 144 N. E. 474, 475,
(1924) (Salesman struck by street car while crossing street. "The mere fact
that the hazard is one to which every person on the street is exposed is not suf-
ficient to defeat compensation."); In re Harraden, 66 Ind. App. 298, 301, 118
N. E. 142, 144 (1917) (slipped on icy sidewalk. "While the conditions produced
by the weather may in a sense affect all alike in the particular vicinity, yet the
fact remains that a person so employed is much more exposed to such hazards than
the public generally because of the duties enjoined upon him by his employment
and the place or places to which he must necessarily go in the discharge of
such duties.").IJ- E. Porter Co. v. Industrial Commission, 301 Ill. 76, 133 N. E. 652 (1922)
(struck by automobile while boarding street car).
" Schroeder & Daly Co. v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, 169 Wis. 567,
569, 173 N. W. 328, 329 (1919i (Salesman slipped and injured leg. "The fact
that others may be exposed to like risks does not change the character of the risk.
to which applicant was exposed.).
1' 184 Mich. 87, 90, 150 N. W. 325, 327 (1915) (Salesman fell on ice while
hurrying to meet street car. "One of the most common risks to which the general
public is exposed is that of slipping and falling upon ice. This risk is encoun-
tered by people generally, irrespective of employment.'). Bla cf. Redner v. H. C.
Faber & Son Co., 233 N. Y. 379, 119 N. E. 842 (1918) (Employee fell while
crossing street between two establishments owned by defendant.).
' For a more complete discussion of street risks see HOROVITZ, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION (1944) 95-99; NoTEs (1931) 80 A. L. R. 126; (1918) 15 N. C.
C. A. 294.
18 Brown, Arising out of the EmPloyment (1931-32) 7 Wis. L. REv. 15 and
67;(1933) 8 Wis. L. REv. 134 and 217.
'Clegg v. Motor Finance Corp., 20 N. J. Misc. 437, 28 A. (2d) 533 (Work.
Comp. Bd. 1942) (Compensation allowed where auto repossessor, failing to locate
defaulting purchaser of car, drove thirty miles beyond to visit wife, and was in-jured while returning and before he had reached home of purchaser.).
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whether the acts were done principally in furtherance of his employer's
business or for his own benefit.' 8
Cases are numerous where compensation has been allowed for in-
juries and death suffered by employees with exceptionally wide dis-
cretionary powers in the performance of acts far beyond what might
usually be thought of as the ordinary scope of employment of a traveling
employee. Thus, in Southwestern Portland Cement Co. v. Simpson,'9
where the decedent was killed in the early hours of the morning while
driving to a night club, compensation was found proper in view of the
fact that the decedent's duties included fraternizing with prospective
customers whenever and wherever possible, and it was established that
his intention in going to the night club was for that purpose. Where
a sales supervisor attended a banquet and party at the request of his
employer, leaving at 3:30 A.M. in a car furnished him by the employer,
bui, instead of going home, parked in front of the employer's establish-
ment and fell asleep, the New Jersey Commission allowed an award
for his death by drowning, caused when the car rolled away into a
canal nearby.20
An unusually liberal award was made by the Pennsylvania court in
Baumann v. Howard . Ehmke Co.21 The decedent there, whose ter-
ritory embraced the entire United States, sold fruit pickers' bags and
followed the fruit crops. He had completed his sales for the Washing-
ton apple season and was staying for a few weeks on the farm of a
friend, awaiting the ripening of the California orange crop, which fact
was known to his employer. While watching his friend split a tree,
decedent was struck by a flying chip from a wedge, and died as a result
of blood poisoning contracted therefrom. The court stated that from
the time the salesman departed from the employer's office in Phila-
delphia until he reported there on the completion of his trip he was
actually engaged in the employer's business unless he did something
to break the employment. This unbounded latitude is not typical of
many jurisdictions, although the New York court allowed a recovery
for the death from malaria of a traveling salesman who, while on a
sales trip in South Africa, was bitten by a mosquito.22 The court held
" Solar-Sturges Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 315 I1. 352, 146 N. E.
572 (1925) (Struck while crossing street from cigar store to establishment of
prospective customer to whom he intended giving cigars just purchased. Award
allowed); accord, Parrish v. Armour & Co. 200 N. C. 654, 158 S. E. 188 (1931)
(on way to buy cigars for customer when injured).
1'135 F. (2d) 584 (C. C. A. 10th, 1943).
.Rafferty v. Dairymen's League Co-op Assn., 16 N. J. Misc. 363, 200 At. 439
(Work. Comp. Bd. 1938).21126 Pa. Super. 108, 190 Atl. 343 (1937).
12 Lepow v. Lepow Knitting Mills, 288 N. Y. 377, 43 N. E. (2d) 450 (1942);
see Marks' Dependents v. Gray, 251 N. Y. 90, 93, 167 N. E. 181, 182 (1929)(". . . the decisive test must be whether it is the employment or something else
which sent the traveler forth upon the journey or brought exposure to its
[Vol. 23
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that the decedent was sent to South Africa upon a mission arranged by
his employer solely to promote its business interests, and that the risks
incidental to his itinerary through regions infested by a death-bearing
insect were special in character, related to his employment, and were
not his own.
The nature of their employment requires many traveling employees
to seek food and lodging in localities to which their duties take them.
A nice question, anti one that finds varied answers in numerous juris-
dictions, is whether injuries incurred while in restaurants or hotels,
rooming houses and the like are compensable as arising out of and in
the course of the employment. Where the employee, stopping at a
hotel or rooming house, has suffered injury or death as the result of
fire breaking out in the building, the courts have generally allowed com-
pensation.23 In a California case, Forman v. Industrial Accident Com-
mission,24 however, where the claimant, a real estate salesman, had
been sent to a town for the purpose of securing customers when and
where he could, and had been instructed to stay there indefinitely, the
court refused compensation for burns suffered when the hotel in which
he was living caught fire, contending that at the time of the fire the
employee was not performing services growing out of and incidental to
the employment and acting within the course of his employment as
such. The Minnesota court in Stansberry v. Monitor Stove Co.2 5 dis-
tinguished that case from the Fornan case in that in the latter the
representative was quartered at the hotel for an indefinite time, and
was not a mere overnight guest.
Where death results from suffocation or asphyxiation caused by the
escape of noxious fumes from heating or lighting equipment in hotel
rooms or tourist cabins, the courts are usually in agreement. The
Texas court28 affirmed an award where the decedent, a traveling col-
lector, engaged a tourist cabin on a November night, and was later
found dead of monoxide poisoning, the windows and doors of the cabin
being closed and the gas heater turned on. In an identical fact situation,
perils.") ; Katz v. Kadans & Co., 232 N. Y. 420, 421, 134 N. E. 330, 331 (1922)
("If the work itself involves exposure to the perils of the street, strange, unan-
ticipated, and infrequent though they may be, the emiployee passes along the street
when on his master's occasions under the.protection of the statute.") (Italics ours).
"Standard Oil Company (Kentucky) v. Witt, 283 Ky. 327, 336, 141 S. W.
(2d) 271, 275 (1940) ("It was certainly and necessarily in the contemplation of
the parties that there would be periods of rest and sleep as essential incidents of
the employment... :') ; Souza's Case, - Mass. - , 55 N. E. (2d) 611 (1944) ;
Thiede v. G. D. Searle & Co., 275 Mich. 108, 270 N. W. 234 (1936) ; Stansberry
v. Monitor Stove Co., 150 Minn. 1, 183 N. W. 977 (1921); Texas Employers'
Insurance Assn. v. Harbuck, 73 S. W. (2d) 113 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
"31 Cal. App. 441, 160 Pac. 857 (1916).
" 150 Minn. 1, 183 N. W. 977 (1921), cited, supra, note 23.
" Texas Employers' Insurance Assn. v. Cobb, 118 S. W. (2d) 375 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1938).
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where the accident happened in the month of January, the California
court2 7 allowed compensation, saying that commercial travelers may
be regarded as acting in the course of their employment so long as they
are traveling in their employer's business, including the whole period
of time between their starting from and returning to their place of
business or home. The Indiana court 28 allowed compensation where a
truck driver was asphyxiated by gas from a tourist cabin heater. The
court made no mention of the unreasonableness of the decedent's ac-
tions, although it appears that he had secured all the windows and doors,
the temperature being two degrees below zero.
The courts have allowed recoveries where a traveling employee fell
from a hotel porch,2 9 and where a traveling salesman fell downstairs
in a home in which he had been invited to spend the night and in which
he had undertaken to perform some of the duties of his employment.8 0
But no recovery was had where the employee fractured his leg in a
tourist cabin shower,3 ' was scalded in a hotel bath room when he slipped
and grabbed the shower lever as he fell,3 2 bled to death from a cut suf-
fered in a fall on the stair of a rooming house at four o'clock Sunday
morning,38 or fell from the stage of a Y.W.C.A. auditorium while
being shown to her room in the dark.3 4
A majority of the courts hold that eating is a mere necessity to
human life and not an incident of the employment. Under this theory
no award was made where a traveling salesman stopped at a public
restaurant, and during the course of the meal a chicken bone became
lodged in his throat, necessitating medical treatment, 85 an insurance
collector and solicitor, entering a restaurant to eat, fell down a flight
of stairs while looking for a washroom,3 6 or contracted typhoid fever
from food served by a carrier in a town to which he had been sent to
sell goods.37 Where compensation has been allowed, the court has
" California Casualty Indemnity Exchange v. Industrial Accident Commission,
5 Cal. (2d) 185, 53 P. (2d) 758 (1936).2 Lasear Inc. v. Anderson, 99 Ind. App. 428, 192 N. E. 762 (1934). But cf.
Kass v. Hirschberg, Schutz & Co., 191 App. Div. 300, 181 N. Y. Supp. 35 (1920).
2Employers' Liability Insurance Co. v. Warren, 172 Tenn. 403, 112 S. W.
(2d) 837 (1938).
" Cowles v. U. S. Rubber Products, 254 App. Div. 123, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 811
(1942).
"i Gibbs Steel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 234 Wis. 375, 10 N. W. (2d) 130
(1943).
"2Davidson v. Pansy Waist Co., 240 N. Y. 584, 148 N. E. 715 (1925) (used
the hotel room to display line of merchandise).3 Wilson v. L. M. Berry & Co., 149 Pa. Super. 492, 27 A. (2d) 721 (1942);
cf. Turner v. Cathedral Publishing Co., 268 N. Y. 656, 198 N. E. 542 (1935).
" Jakeway v. John V. Bauer Co., 218 App. Div. 302, 218 N. Y. Supp. 193
(1926).
"
2Barron v. W. W. Norton & Co., 264 App. Div. 802, 34 N. Y. S. (2d) 740
(1942).
8 Goldman v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 276 N. Y. 582, 12 N. E.
(2d) 587 (1937).
'Johnson v. Smith, 263 N. Y. 10, 188 N. E. 140 (1933).
[Vol. 23
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justified its action on the grounds that the employee, after entering the
restaurant, did some act or acts in furtherance of the employment.38
The Texas court in Wynn v. Southern Surety Co.,3 9 under a parallel
fact situation to the principal case, denied recovery and announced a
somewhat blanket rule on injuries of this type. "A traveling salesman,
while eating his meals, or sleeping at hotels, or attending church or
theatres, or going on private picnics or errands for his own pleasure
or profit, is not, within the contemplation of the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act, engaged in his employer's business, and an injury received
by him while performing said acts or engaged in said recreation is not,
within the purview of said law, an injury received 'in the course of the
employment.' "40
There seems to be little likelihood of any extension of the protection
afforded employees of this type within the jurisdiction of the Georgia
court, for it is said in the principal case,4 1 "To hold that there was a
causal connection between the employment and the injury in this case,
which is necessary to sustain the award, would be the equivalent of
holding that a traveling salesman while away from home or headquar-
ters, is in continuous employment, and that any accident which he may
suffer arises out of and in the course of his employment. We do not
understand that to be the rule in. Georgia." It is submitted that the
application of such a rule would be unwise in any jurisdiction.
The reader will note that all cases cited have involved persons who
were clearly employees, and that no attempt has been made to digest
cases deciding the question of whether the particular claimant's status
was actually that of employee, or whether his particular characteristics
marked him as an independent contractor. This discussion was omitted
for the sake of brevity, but it would be error to make no mention what-
soever of the situation as it -does exist.
The true traveling salesman is somewhat of a hybrid among em-
ployees. The unique status which he occupies is a result of the fact
that the very movements which bring him closer and closer to the
unprotected realm of independent contractor, that is, the extension and
enlargement of his freedom of action and area of activity, operate at the
same time to give him ever-extending protection until such time as he
oversteps the vague bounds of employment into the category of inde-
" Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Pruitt, 63 Ga. App. 149, 10 S. E.(2d) 275 (1940) (entered cafe to inquire as to whereabouts of prospective cus-
tomer and fell from stool after eating a meal therein) ; Everard v. Woman's Home
Companion Reading Club, 234 Mo. App. 760, 122 S. W. (2d) 51 (1938) (stepped
on splinter while leaving lunchroom after eating meal with superior, discussing
afternoon s work, and writing" out order solicited earlier in the day).
s' 26 S. W. (2d) 691 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) (salesman struck by car while
returning to hotel from restaurant).
'
0 Id. at page 693.
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Thornton, - Ga. App. - , 31
S. E. (2d) 115, 117 (1944).
1945]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
pendent contract. The view of the Georgia court was that, while the
traveling employee can be classified as an employee, he must be treated
as such. Thus, as it was stated in the Thornton case, "The scope and
range of a traveling man's territorial activity necessarily broadens the
field of his employment, but in no other way is a traveling eniployee
distinguished under the act from ordinary employees who do not have
to travel in the performance of their work."' 42
In the final analysis the problem may be solved in either of two
ways. The court may set a definite boundary line in each instance over
which no traveling employee may step still clothed in the protective
covering of the act, or the court must resolve that, as a matter of
policy, all traveling employees, and perhaps employees of any nature,
will be compensated for any and all accidental injuries arising in the
course of activities in any way connected or associated with the employ-
ment, throwing the resultant burden on the employer who passes the
increased operating expense on to the consumer of his product or serv-
ices in the form of increased charges. What future courts will choose
to do can only be surmised. It is clear that the present trend of the
Georgia court is toward the former policy.
CHARLES F. CoIRA, JR.
Corporations-Withholding Charter Because No
North Carolina Incorporator
Press reports of January 15 stated that the Secretary of State had
refused "to issue the charter," i.e., to file the certificate of incorporation
of an oil company and certify a copy because no incorporator was a
resident of this state.1 The obstacle was met by adding a North Caro-
lina subscriber, presumably by issuing him one share of stock. The
news story correctly stated that the North Carolina corporation law
does not require any incorporator to be a resident2 but does require one
director to be and provides that all directors must be bona fide stock-
holders.8 As the business of the corporation must be managed by its
directors,a this means that sooner or later there must be a North Caro-
lina stockholder if the law is complied with. Nevertheless a corporation
might be organized sometime in advance of entering upon active busi-
ness4 and there is nothing in the law to prevent it existing for that
period without North Carolina stockholders. After the corporation is
once organized, however, it might merely ignore the legislative direc-
42Ibid.
'Durham Sun (Jan. 15, 1945), P. - , col. - , re: Tidewater Petroleum
and Gas Co.IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §55-2.
'Id. at §55-48. Quaere, what is meant by "bona fide."
a Ibid
' See Hammond v. Williams, 215 N. C. 657, 659, 3 S. E. (2d) 437, 439 (1939).
[Vol. 23
